We study revenue maximization for digital auctions, where there are infinitely many copies of a good for sale. There are n buyers, each of whom is interested in obtaining one copy of the good. The buyers' private valuations are drawn from a joint distribution F . The seller does not know this distribution. The only information that she has are the mean µi and variance σ 2 i of each buyer i's marginal distribution Fi. We call such auctions parametric auctions.
INTRODUCTION
In a Bayesian auction of a digital good, there is one good for sale, available in an unlimited number of copies, and n buyers, each interested in buying one copy of the good. Each buyer i has a value vi for the good, and the vector (v1, ..., vn) is drawn from a joint distribution F .
There are many real-world examples of such a setting, including but not limited to, selling music online, selling copies * A full version of this working paper is available at http://people.csail.mit.edu/azar/wp-content/ uploads/2012/11/ParametricDigitalMechanisms.pdf † Supported by MIT-SkTech Grant # 019683-081
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How much revenue can we guarantee to the seller in such a setting? If F is a product distribution and the seller knows F , then an adaptation of Myerson's optimal auction [2] guarantees the maximum revenue that any incentive compatible mechanism can obtain.
We work with strictly weaker assumptions. Namely, 1. F is an arbitrary joint distribution; and 2. The seller only knows the mean µi and standard deviation σi of each buyer i's marginal distribution Fi.
We call such an auction a parametric auction. For a digital goods setting we construct a parametric auction A, that simultaneously (i) achieves a significant fraction of the optimal revenue, and
(ii) is maximin optimal among all parametric posted price mechanisms.
That is, our auction is a posted price mechanism and, for any other parametric posted price mechanism A, and for every pair of parameter vectors (µ1, ...., µn) and (σ1, ..., σn), there exists a distribution F -whose marginals have the given parameters-for which our A obtains strictly more revenue than A. Since A is a deterministic posted price mechanism, it is dominant strategy truthful and very practical to implement. Furthermore, because we only require knowledge of the first two moments of the distribution, the seller can easily learn the information that she needs from a limited amount of data, while it may be infeasible to learn the whole distribution F .
OUR RESULTS
We denote by Rev(OP T, F ) the optimal revenue achievable by a truthful auction which has knowledge of the distribution F . For any auction A and distribution F , the competitive ratio of A is given by
A parametric lower bound on the competitive ratio..
We construct a digital auction A that is competitive with the optimal auction. The competitive ratio is constant in the number of players and does not rely on any kind of symmetry, independence, or regularity of the distribution F . However, it will be a function of the ratios
. This is intuitive because if σi is very large compared with µi, then the seller has very little information about Fi, and one cannot expect her to collect significant revenue from player i.
More concretely, for any distribution F with parameter vectors µ, σ and for any player i our auction satisfies
where ρ(·) is a function of
with the following properties:
) is always positive when µi, σi are positive.
•
i Revi(A, F ), we will be able to conclude that, as long as the marginals F1, ..., Fn are c-informative distributions, our auction A will have a competitive ratio bounded below by a constant
A parametric upper bound on the competitive ratio for posted price mechanisms.
It is a priori possible that one could obtain more than a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. That is, an auctioneer who knows only the first and second moments of the distribution F could guarantee a profit arbitrarily close to optimal as the number n of players grows very large. We show that this is impossible if we restrict the auctioneer to use posted price mechanisms. That is, for any parametric posted price mechanism A, and any parameter vectors µ, σ there exists a distribution F with the given parameters such that
where ψ(·) is a function of
with the following properties • ψ(
That is, our upper bound on the competitive ratio is a constant less than one when µ i σ i is constant. When µi is much larger than σi, then the upper bound is meaningless (indeed, as µi becomes large, the revenue of our parametric auction A approaches the optimal auction). When σi is much larger than µi, no parametric posted price mechanism can obtain any significant fraction of the optimal revenue. For these mechanisms, this result formalizes our intuition that a very large standard deviation implies an "uninformative" distribution from which we can not guarantee any revenue.
Maximin Optimality and the Digital Auction A..
As said above, our digital auction A is competitive with the optimal auction, where the competitive ratio depends on
. Examining the competitive ratio is a meaningful way to give revenue guarantees when the full distribution is not known. However, there can be a multiplicity of parametric auctions which achieve a constant competitive ratio, and it may be difficult to decide which one is the "best." Any definition of optimality for parametric auctions needs to take into account the uncertainty that the seller has over the joint distribution F . Since this is a worst-case uncertainty, our definition of optimality for parametric mechanisms is based on worst-case revenue maximization. Definition 1. Let M be a class of mechanisms and let Dµ,σ be the class of distributions which have parameter vectors µ and σ. An auction A * is maximin optimal for M if A * ∈ M and, given parameter vectors µ and σ we have,
Rev(A, F ).
We highlight that, in the definition, A * is the unique mechanism maximizing worst-case revenue. We show that A is maximin optimal for the class of parametric posted price mechanisms.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In a Bayesian setting, it is important to construct auctions that are as detail-free as possible while still guaranteeing good revenue. In this paper, we focused on a seller auctioning who has knowledge of the means and variances of players' valuations and who wants to auction a digital good. These however, are not the only parameters that can be helpful in constructing parametric auctions, or the only environments of interest. In particular, the authors, together with Daskalakis and Weinberg [1] have extended this model to use the median and other quantiles as parameters, and have constructed approximately optimal parametric auctions for matroid environments where the players' distributions are independent and regular. For downward closed environments, an analogous result applies when the distributions have a monotone hazard rate. In the future, we plan to construct auctions that use higher order moments and covariances in order to guarantee more revenue in more general settings, including auctions with multidimensional types.
